On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions

Standard

On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions. / Paulus, Frieder M; Müller-Pinzler, Laura; Westermann, Stefan; Krach, Sören.

in: FRONT HUM NEUROSCI, Jahrgang 7, 2013, S. 196.

Publikationen: SCORING: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift/ZeitungSCORING: ZeitschriftenaufsatzForschungBegutachtung

Harvard

Paulus, FM, Müller-Pinzler, L, Westermann, S & Krach, S 2013, 'On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions', FRONT HUM NEUROSCI, Jg. 7, S. 196. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00196

APA

Paulus, F. M., Müller-Pinzler, L., Westermann, S., & Krach, S. (2013). On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions. FRONT HUM NEUROSCI, 7, 196. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00196

Vancouver

Bibtex

@article{350c3908dd2e4933a4d3355f7dbfca94,
title = "On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions",
abstract = "In the introduction to the special issue {"}The Neural Underpinnings of Vicarious Experience{"} the editors state that one {"}may feel embarrassed when witnessing another making a social faux pas{"}. In our commentary we address this statement and ask whether this example introduces a vicarious or an empathic form of embarrassment. We elaborate commonalities and differences between these two forms of emotional experiences and discuss their underlying mechanisms. We suggest that both, vicarious and empathic emotions, originate from the simulation processes mirroring and mentalizing that depend on anchoring and adjustment. We claim the term {"}empathic emotion{"} to be reserved exclusively for incidents where perceivers and social targets have shared affective experience, whereas {"}vicarious emotion{"} offers a wider scope and also includes non-shared affective experiences. Both are supposed to be highly functional in social interactions.",
author = "Paulus, {Frieder M} and Laura M{\"u}ller-Pinzler and Stefan Westermann and S{\"o}ren Krach",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.3389/fnhum.2013.00196",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "196",
journal = "FRONT HUM NEUROSCI",
issn = "1662-5161",
publisher = "Frontiers Research Foundation",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions

AU - Paulus, Frieder M

AU - Müller-Pinzler, Laura

AU - Westermann, Stefan

AU - Krach, Sören

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In the introduction to the special issue "The Neural Underpinnings of Vicarious Experience" the editors state that one "may feel embarrassed when witnessing another making a social faux pas". In our commentary we address this statement and ask whether this example introduces a vicarious or an empathic form of embarrassment. We elaborate commonalities and differences between these two forms of emotional experiences and discuss their underlying mechanisms. We suggest that both, vicarious and empathic emotions, originate from the simulation processes mirroring and mentalizing that depend on anchoring and adjustment. We claim the term "empathic emotion" to be reserved exclusively for incidents where perceivers and social targets have shared affective experience, whereas "vicarious emotion" offers a wider scope and also includes non-shared affective experiences. Both are supposed to be highly functional in social interactions.

AB - In the introduction to the special issue "The Neural Underpinnings of Vicarious Experience" the editors state that one "may feel embarrassed when witnessing another making a social faux pas". In our commentary we address this statement and ask whether this example introduces a vicarious or an empathic form of embarrassment. We elaborate commonalities and differences between these two forms of emotional experiences and discuss their underlying mechanisms. We suggest that both, vicarious and empathic emotions, originate from the simulation processes mirroring and mentalizing that depend on anchoring and adjustment. We claim the term "empathic emotion" to be reserved exclusively for incidents where perceivers and social targets have shared affective experience, whereas "vicarious emotion" offers a wider scope and also includes non-shared affective experiences. Both are supposed to be highly functional in social interactions.

U2 - 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00196

DO - 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00196

M3 - SCORING: Journal article

C2 - 23720621

VL - 7

SP - 196

JO - FRONT HUM NEUROSCI

JF - FRONT HUM NEUROSCI

SN - 1662-5161

ER -