Experience-based knowledge increases confidence in discriminating our memories

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Experience-based knowledge increases confidence in discriminating our memories. / Cichoń, Ewelina; Gawęda, Łukasz; Moritz, Steffen; Szczepanowski, Remigiusz.

In: CURR PSYCHOL, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2021, p. 840-852.

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@article{71cf3e754cd04a59ae1b48fe3b06c10a,
title = "Experience-based knowledge increases confidence in discriminating our memories",
abstract = "The present study investigated the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in source monitoring with self-report scales engaging either information- or experienced-based knowledge. We expected that the source monitoring abilities may be affected by the origins of meta-knowledge that underlie post-decision wagering (PDW) based on economic categorizations (experience-based scale) and confidence ratings (CR) using a conventional taxonomy of confidence (information-based scale). To examine this hypothesis, healthy participants (N = 50) performed an action memory task, in which simple actions were presented in order to be performed or imagined. In the second phase of the task, participants were required to assess source monitoring by distinguishing whether the presented action was performed or imagined. Then, the participants randomly assigned into the PDW or CR group rated their confidence in responses related to source monitoring performance. It was found that source monitoring ability is resistant to manipulation of the type of knowledge used in the scales. However, measures of metacognition indicated that accuracy of the experienced-based judgments of PDW was higher as compared to the CR scale while source monitoring. These findings suggest the origin of knowledge whose justification rests more on empirical observations generates more accurate knowledge than self-evident direct intuition with respect to discriminations of one{\textquoteright}s own memories.",
keywords = "Confidence ratings, Metacognition, Post-decision wagering, Source monitoring",
author = "Ewelina Cicho{\'n} and {\L}ukasz Gaw{\c e}da and Steffen Moritz and Remigiusz Szczepanowski",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018, The Author(s). Copyright: Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1007/s12144-018-0011-8",
language = "English",
volume = "40",
pages = "840--852",
journal = "CURR PSYCHOL",
issn = "1046-1310",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Experience-based knowledge increases confidence in discriminating our memories

AU - Cichoń, Ewelina

AU - Gawęda, Łukasz

AU - Moritz, Steffen

AU - Szczepanowski, Remigiusz

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2018, The Author(s). Copyright: Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - The present study investigated the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in source monitoring with self-report scales engaging either information- or experienced-based knowledge. We expected that the source monitoring abilities may be affected by the origins of meta-knowledge that underlie post-decision wagering (PDW) based on economic categorizations (experience-based scale) and confidence ratings (CR) using a conventional taxonomy of confidence (information-based scale). To examine this hypothesis, healthy participants (N = 50) performed an action memory task, in which simple actions were presented in order to be performed or imagined. In the second phase of the task, participants were required to assess source monitoring by distinguishing whether the presented action was performed or imagined. Then, the participants randomly assigned into the PDW or CR group rated their confidence in responses related to source monitoring performance. It was found that source monitoring ability is resistant to manipulation of the type of knowledge used in the scales. However, measures of metacognition indicated that accuracy of the experienced-based judgments of PDW was higher as compared to the CR scale while source monitoring. These findings suggest the origin of knowledge whose justification rests more on empirical observations generates more accurate knowledge than self-evident direct intuition with respect to discriminations of one’s own memories.

AB - The present study investigated the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in source monitoring with self-report scales engaging either information- or experienced-based knowledge. We expected that the source monitoring abilities may be affected by the origins of meta-knowledge that underlie post-decision wagering (PDW) based on economic categorizations (experience-based scale) and confidence ratings (CR) using a conventional taxonomy of confidence (information-based scale). To examine this hypothesis, healthy participants (N = 50) performed an action memory task, in which simple actions were presented in order to be performed or imagined. In the second phase of the task, participants were required to assess source monitoring by distinguishing whether the presented action was performed or imagined. Then, the participants randomly assigned into the PDW or CR group rated their confidence in responses related to source monitoring performance. It was found that source monitoring ability is resistant to manipulation of the type of knowledge used in the scales. However, measures of metacognition indicated that accuracy of the experienced-based judgments of PDW was higher as compared to the CR scale while source monitoring. These findings suggest the origin of knowledge whose justification rests more on empirical observations generates more accurate knowledge than self-evident direct intuition with respect to discriminations of one’s own memories.

KW - Confidence ratings

KW - Metacognition

KW - Post-decision wagering

KW - Source monitoring

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85053906691&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s12144-018-0011-8

DO - 10.1007/s12144-018-0011-8

M3 - SCORING: Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85053906691

VL - 40

SP - 840

EP - 852

JO - CURR PSYCHOL

JF - CURR PSYCHOL

SN - 1046-1310

IS - 2

ER -